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Abstract
Using an endogenous preferential trade agreement (PTA) formation model under all pos-
sible multilaterally negotiated bound tari¤ rates, we examine the e¤ects of multilateral trade
liberalization on the role of PTAs in achieving global free trade. We rst show that, when
countries are completely symmetric, no country has an incentive to unilaterally deviate (free
ride) from free trade network while exclusion incentives arise when bound tari¤s are su¢ ciently
low. Due to the relatively exible nature of the FTA formation, such exclusion incentives go
unexercised and free trade always obtains as the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) of
the FTA game. However, such exibility does not exist under the CU game and thus countries
are able to exercise the exclusion incentive and free trade fails to be CPNE when the bound
tari¤ rates are su¢ ciently low. We then consider a scenario where countries are asymmetric with
respect to their comparative advantage. The country with a weaker comparative advantage has
an incentive to free ride on trade liberalization of the other two countries and lower bound tari¤
rates disciplines this incentive via limiting the ability to set optimal tari¤s. As a result, multi-
lateral free trade is more likely to be a CPNE as the multilateral negotiated bound tari¤ rates
decline. This result provides support for the idea that multilateral trade liberalization acts as a
complement to the FTA formation in achieving global free trade.
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1 Introduction
Since the creation of the 1948 General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT), trade liberaliza-
tion has proceeded along two major fronts: (i) periodic rounds of multilateral negotiations that
are open to all member countries and (ii) the formation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs)
that entails the exchange of trade policy concessions amongst only a subset of WTO members.
GATT/WTO concluded eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, reducing the average ad
valorem tari¤s on industrial goods to below 4 percent and expanding the multilateral systems
membership from 23 to 164 economies. Especially, after the Uruguay round of tari¤ negotiations in
1994, MFN principle along with country-by-country lower tari¤ binding commitments had success-
fully generated signicant trade liberalization. However, multilateral trade liberalization process
has ground to a halt with the Doha round that has failed to yield a bargain that is acceptable to
all sides despite sixteen years of intense negotiations. By contrast, preferential trade liberalization
has become increasingly popular in recent years, with the number of PTAs increased ve-fold since
the completion of the Uruguay round of the WTO negotiations in 1994.1
Economists and policy-makers have long suspected that the contrasting fortunes of these two
types of trade liberalization may be inter-related. Dealing with the widespread concern that the
formation of PTAs may undermine multilateral liberalization and serve as an alternative, rather
than a complement, to multilateral trade liberalization, there exists an extensive literature that has
addressed the impact of PTAs on optimal tari¤s, multilateral tari¤ reduction, and on the prospects
of global free trade.2 However, the reverse analysis on how multilateral tari¤ reduction a¤ects the
formation of PTAs and alters the role of Article XXIV of the GATT in achieving global free trade
is relatively scarce.3 This paper aims at lling this gap in the literature using an endogenous PTA
formation model in examining equilibrium agreements as the multilaterally negotiated bound tari¤
rates bound tari¤ rates fall.
As explained in detail in Bown and Crowley (2016), membership in the WTO requires that
countries take on commitments with respect to their tari¤s. The rst such commitment is the
application of symmetric tari¤ rates on imports from all other WTO members via the most-favored-
nation (MFN) principle of nondiscrimination. Second, a WTO member agrees to take on legally
binding commitment on chosen set of products that is a cap above which it promises not to raise
its applied tari¤. For each of those products with some legally binding commitment, the member
chooses an exact value for this upper limit that is referred to as the tari¤ bindingor tari¤ cap.
A WTO member countrys MFN applied rate must therefore be less than or equal to the bound
1Roughly 90% of the existing PTAs take the form of FTAs, with CUs comprising the rest (Freund and Ornelas,
2010). However, the existing CUs do involve major trading areas of the world: the EU and much of Latin America
(where MERCOSUR resides).
2Prominent examples in this strand of literature include papers by Krugman (1991), Bhagwati (1991), Yi (1996),
Bagwell and Staiger (1997a, 1997b, 1998, 2005a, 2005b), Krishna (1998), Riezamn (1999), Goyal and Joshi (2006),
Konishi and Furusawa (2007), Aghion et. al (2007), Ornelas (2005, 2007), Saggi (2006), Saggi and Yildiz (2010,
2011), Saggi et. al (2013, 2016), Stoyanov and Yildiz (2015) and Lake (2017).
3 In a detailed survey, Freund and Ornelas (2010) documents the scarcity of analyses on how multilateralism a¤ects
regionalism. Very few examples include Ethier (1998), Freund (2000) and Lake and Roy (2017).
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tari¤ rate (tari¤ binding) in order to be legal under the WTO.4 While MFN constitutes the very
rst Article of the GATT and is widely viewed as the central pillar of the world trading system, its
salience is called into question by the existence of Article XXIV of GATT the legal clause that
sanctions preferential and/or discriminatory trade liberalization amongst WTO members subject
to certain conditions, the most important of which are that PTA members must eliminate internal
tari¤s on substantially all tradewith each other and also refrain from increasing their external
MFN tari¤s on non-members.
Our point of departure is a world in which all countries are the WTO members that face
exogenously given multilaterally negotiated bound tari¤ rates and thus their applied rates under
any trade regime must therefore be less than or equal to the tari¤ bindings. Under these tari¤
bindings, countries endogenously choose whether to form PTAs. Here, it is important to note that
the level of the bound tari¤ rates signicantly a¤ects the ability of countries to impose optimal tari¤s
and thus the preferences of both member and non-member countries regarding PTA formation. As
a result, it has strong implications on whether PTA formation ultimately leads to global free
trade or ends prematurely with a fragmented trading world with gated globalization. Does the
reduction in the multilaterally negotiated tari¤ bindings enhance the role of the PTA formation
for the prospects of global free trade? In other words, does the multilateral trade liberalization
complement preferential trade liberalization in achieving global free trade? Do the answers to
these questions depend on the nature of the PTAs (FTA versus CU)? To address these questions,
we develop an equilibrium theory of trade agreements and use it to shed light on the interaction
between bilateral and multilateral approaches to trade liberalization with a ner lens.
We utilize an adapted version of the comparative advantage based framework of Horn et al.
(2010) where there are three countries and every country is a competing exporter with each of
the other two countries in two goods and imports a unique good. Our conceptual approach to the
formation of trade agreements follows Saggi and Yildiz (2010) who develop an equilibrium theory of
FTAs. Each country is free to pursue either no trade liberalization or bilateral trade liberalization
or multilateral free trade and set their optimal tari¤s endogenously as long as bound tari¤ rates are
su¢ ciently high.5 Most of the existing literature on trade agreements fails to explain when and why
countries might deliberately choose to free ride on trade liberalization by other countries or exclude
others from their mutual trade liberalization. To address the free riding and exclusion incentives in
a convincing manner, one needs a model of an endogenous formation of trade agreements in which
countries are active participants in trade agreement negotiations. This way, one can determine
whether a country has an incentive to free ride while the others have an incentive to include
it in the free trade network or some countries prefer to exclude others from their mutual trade
liberalization even though they wish to be included. This paper aims to provide such a model and
4 If a country raises its tari¤ beyond its bound rate, the countries adversely a¤ected are able to seek remedy via
the dispute settlement process through which they may obtain the right to retaliate against an equivalent value of
the o¤ending countrys exports or the right to receive compensation, usually in the form of reduced tari¤s on other
products they export to the o¤ending country.
5Since all countries have market power in our model, allowing for unilateral liberalization is not necessary: no
country will choose to pursue such liberalization in our model.
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use it to assess not only the strength of the free riding and exclusion incentives under both types
of PTAs but also the ability of member countries to exercise such incentives in equilibrium when
bound tari¤ rates are exogenously given.
We rst examine the coalition proof Nash equilibrium agreements of the PTA formation game
between symmetric countries for all possible levels of bound tari¤ rates. This exercise allows to
isolate the consequences of the interaction of the multilateral reduction in bound tari¤ rates and
PTA formation in achieving global free trade. Then, we extend our analysis into a setting where
countries are asymmetric with respect to their degree of comparative advantage.
We rst nd that the formation of a bilateral PTA (both FTA and CU) induces each member to
lower its tari¤ on the non-member country relative to the status quo, i.e. the model exhibits tari¤
complementarity. As a result, exogenously given bound tari¤ rates lead to three distinct scenarios:
(i) no tari¤ binding scenario where the bound tari¤ rate exceeds the optimal Nash tari¤s and
countries are free to impose their optimal tari¤s under all trade regimes; (ii) partial tari¤ binding
scenario where the bound tari¤ rate exceeds the optimal tari¤ of a member country under a PTA
but falls below the optimal Nash tari¤s and thus the member countries under a PTA are free to
impose their optimal external tari¤s while the non-member country under a PTA is required to
apply the bound tari¤ rate and (iii) full tari¤ binding scenario where the bound tari¤ rate falls
below the optimal tari¤s of member countries under a PTA and thus countries lose their freedom
to impose optimal external tari¤s under all possible trade regimes and are required to apply their
bound tari¤ rates. Note that while the tari¤ binding overhang exists in the rst two scenarios, it
disappears in the nal scenario.6 Most of the research in the existing literature on trade agreements
ignores the bound tari¤ rates and thus focus on the very rst scenario where countries impose their
optimal tari¤s.7 In this paper, we go one step further and examine more realistic cases where
countries are not able to impose their optimal tari¤s due to su¢ ciently low bound tari¤ rates.
Our analysis on how the reduction in the bound tari¤ rates a¤ects countriespreferences for PTA
formation delivers several interesting insights. We rst show that, when countries are completely
symmetric, no country has an incentive to unilaterally deviate (free ride) from free trade network
regardless of the level of bound tari¤ rates and the type of PTAs (FTA or CU) while two countries
have incentives to jointly exclude the third one via FTA or CU from free trade network when bound
tari¤s are su¢ ciently low. The intuition behind these results can be explained as follows. On one
hand, when the bound tari¤ rates fall below the optimal Nash tari¤s, the non-member country
under a bilateral PTA loses its ability to set its optimal MFN tari¤ and is required to impose the
bound tari¤ rate that is lower than the optimal MFN rate. On the other hand, the PTA member
countries fully enjoy free access in each others market and are either (i) fully able to impose their
optimal external tari¤s (as under the partial tari¤ binding scenario) or (ii) impose the same external
tari¤ as the non-member country (as under the full tari¤ binding scenario). These forces together
6The tari¤ binding overhang literature includes Bagwell and Staiger (2005a), Amador and Bagwell (2013) and
Beshkar et. al (2015) who argue that uncertianty over governments future political economy motivations during
trade negotiations can justify the demand for the exibility over future applied tari¤s.
7See Furusawa and Konishi (2007), Saggi and Yildiz (2010) and Saggi et. al (2013), Lake and Yildiz (2016).
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imply that the free riding incentives become weaker while the exclusion incentives arise as the bound
tari¤ rates fall. Here, it is important to note that Saggi and Yildiz (2010) show that there exists no
exclusion incentive under symmetry in a competing exporters model. Our result suggests that this
result fails to hold when countries are constrained in imposing their optimal tari¤s due to su¢ ciently
low bound tari¤ rates. In an oligopoly model of trade, Freund (2000) shows that multilateral tari¤
reduction a¤ects the formation of PTAs, enhancing the incentives to form a PTA relative to free
trade. In this paper, we conrm that this result also holds in a comparative advantage model
where trade is inter-industry in nature. However, one should note that the PTA formation is not
endogenously modeled in Freund (2000) and the possibility of forming a hub and spoke regime is
ignored. As will be discussed below, these di¤erences lead to an important divergence in the results
of Freund (2000) and the present paper.
As is well known, the central di¤erence between a bilateral FTA and a bilateral CU is that FTA
members impose individually optimum external tari¤s while members of a CU impose common
external tari¤s. This di¤erence in tari¤ setting behavior between the two types of PTAs has
important consequences. The requirement that CU members set a common external tari¤ implies
that individual CU members do not have the ability to form an additional PTA without the consent
of other CU members while FTA members are free to enter into additional FTAs with non-member
countries without requiring consent from its existing FTA partners. In other words, FTA members
enjoy more exibility than CU members. We show that this crucial di¤erence between a CU and
an FTA has important consequences for the prospect of global free trade. First, it is immediate
to note under the no tari¤ binding and partial tari¤ binding scenarios that, the joint external
tari¤ determination under a CU leads to higher external tari¤s relative to the ones under an FTA.
Therefore, under such a case, the free riding incentive of a country is weaker when facing a CU
relative to an FTA while the exclusion incentive of CU members is stronger than the one of FTA
members. Under the full tari¤ binding scenario, since all countries impose the exogenously given
bound tari¤ rates, a bilateral CU is identical to a bilateral FTA from both member and non-member
countriesperspectives. It is important to note here that the exibility of FTA formation implies
that hub and spoke type of regime is an option under FTA formation only and thus FTAs are more
susceptible to opportunistic unilateral deviations by member countries than CUs. As stated above,
when countries are symmetric, countries have no incentives to free ride while exclusion incentives
arise under both FTA and CU games when bound tari¤s are su¢ ciently low. We nd that free
trade always obtains as the CPNE of the FTA game since exclusion incentives go unexercised in
the equilibrium due to the exibility in FTA formation. However, unlike the FTA formation game,
countries are able to exercise the exclusion incentive under the CU game and free trade fails to be
a CPNE when the bound tari¤ rates are su¢ ciently low and thus the pursuit of CUs undermines
global free trade.
To understand the intuition behind this key result, suppose we start with announcements leading
to free trade. Due to the existence of an exclusion incentive in our model, two countries benet
if they jointly deviate to announcements wherein they call for an FTA with only each other when
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tari¤ bindings are low. As per the concept of a CPNE, for this joint deviation to be self enforcing,
one of these initially deviating countries should not have an incentive to further deviate, taking the
announcement of the complement as xed. We nd that the initial deviation is never self-enforcing
since the welfare of a hub country under a hub and spoke regime exceeds that of the member
of a single FTA and thus free trade is always a CPNE under the FTA game when countries are
symmetric. By contrast, two independent CUs (a hub and spoke type arrangement) are not feasible
due to common external tari¤ requirement and thus the initial joint deviation of two countries that
converts free trade to a bilateral CU is self-enforcing and free trade fails to be a CPNE in the
CU game when bound tari¤s are su¢ ciently low. As a result, whereas the exclusion incentive is
reected in the equilibrium of the CU game, it goes unexpressed in the FTA game due to the lure
of a hub and spoke arrangement and the exibility that FTA members have in pursuing such an
arrangement.
Given that free trade always arises as a CPNE under the FTA game when countries are com-
pletely symmetric, we next examine under what circumstances, if any, free trade fails to be a
CPNE. We show that such a possibility arises only when countries are asymmetric with respect to
their comparative advantage.8 It turns out that, due to smaller export and larger import volumes,
the country with a weaker comparative advantage in the exporting goods has an incentive to free
ride on trade liberalization between the other countries. Lower bound tari¤ rates disciplines this
incentive via limiting the ability of setting optimal tari¤s. As before, due to the lure of a hub
and spoke arrangement and the relatively exible nature of FTA formation, exclusion incentives go
unexercised and free riding incentive becomes pivotal for multilateral free trade to be a CPNE. As
a result, multilateral free trade is more likely to be a CPNE as the multilateral negotiated bound
tari¤ rates decline. This result provides support for the idea that multilateral trade liberalization
acts as a complement to the FTA formation in achieving global free trade: FTA formation is more
likely to act as a building bloc when it is accompanied by lower bound tari¤ rates.
The link between multilateral trade liberalization and PTA formation has also been examined
in the earlier literature. Ethier (1998) addresses the relationship between multilateralism and the
formation of PTAs in a small countrylarge country model. He argues that regionalism is a be-
nign consequence of the success of multilateralism since it allows small countries to benet from
formation of FTAs with large countries to gain a marginal advantage over other small countries
in attracting foreign direct investment. In this paper, we abstract from foreign investment and
simply focus on international trade between three large open economies. One of the closely related
paper to the present paper is Freund (2000) that takes bilateral PTAs and multilateral free trade
as exogenously given, ignoring the hub and spoke regime in a symmetric oligopoly model of trade.
By contrast, we employ an endogenous FTA formation approach in a perfectly competitive com-
parative advantage model in which multilateral free trade is a collection of free trade agreements.
While our results extend support to Freund (2000) in that, as bound tari¤s fall, the forces pulling
8Our results extend support to Krugman (1991) and Grossman and Helpman (1995) who argue that asymmetries
across countries can play a crucial role in determining incentives for preferential and multilateral trade liberalization.
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countries away from free trade into bilateral agreements strengthen implying that the exclusion
incentive rises with the multilateral tari¤ reduction. Unlike Freund (2000), we show that the ex-
clusion incentive goes unexercised and free riding incentive becomes pivotal in a model where FTA
formation is endogenous. Another important di¤erence is that, rather than employing a repeated
game framework as in Freund (2000), we use CPNE concept to sort out the trade agreements that
are immune to self-enforcing coalitional deviations.9
Our paper is also very closely related to the recent paper by Lake and Roy (2017) that uses a
model where multilateral tari¤ negotiations precede sequential FTAs and show that FTA forma-
tion expands to global free trade in the absence of global tari¤ negotiations but global free trade
never emerges when global tari¤ negotiations precede FTA formation. It is argued that preceding
multilateral negotiations can be the cause of so called gated globalization. In fact, gated global-
izationis very similar to our exclusion incentive discussion in a static framework and thus our CU
game leads to a very similar result as in Lake and Roy (2017). However, the dynamic farsighted
model in Lake and Roy (2017) along with preceding endogenous multilateral negotiations make
exclusion incentives more pivotal and lead to di¤erent equilibrium outcome in the FTA formation
game. While the motivation and trade models are quite similar, the major di¤erence is that we
use exogenous bound tari¤s to capture all possible tari¤ binding scenarios whereas Lake and Roy
(2017) endogenizes the multilateral tari¤ negotiations. In linking the multilateral and preferential
trade liberalization in an endogenous way, the use of sequential nature of the game in Lake and
Roy (2017) assumes that governments are forward looking and when undertaking global tari¤ ne-
gotiations they anticipate the possibility of FTA formation even though they do not yet know the
precise sequential order in which country pairs will form FTAs. We take a totally di¤erent stand-
point, arguing that it is hard to believe that countries were anticipating the proliferation of PTAs
and rather there were several other determinants and policy priorities during the last successful
round of multilateral trade negotiations (Uruguay round) and thus taking the bound tari¤ rates
exogenously given seems to be a more reasonable approach.
2 Trade model
Our underlying economic framework is an adapted version of the two-country model of Horn et al.
(2010). We consider a perfectly competitive world with three large countries: z = i; j; and k and
three (non-numéraire) goods: g = I, J , and K and a numéraire good v0. On the demand side, the
representative citizens utility function is assumed to be quasi-linear:
U(v; v0) = u(v) + v0; (1)
where v = [vI ; vJ ; vK ] is the consumption vector for the three non-numéraire goods, v0 denotes the
consumption of the numéraire good, and u(v) is quadratic and additively separable in the three
9Other papers that examine the relationship between preferential and multilateral liberalization in models of
repeated interaction between countries include Bagwell and Staiger (1997a, 1997b), Bond et. al. (2001) and Saggi
(2006).
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non-numéraire goods. The demand for good g in country z is then given by
dgz(p
g
z) =   pgz (2)
where pgz denotes the consumer price of good g in country z. Assuming that the population in each
country is a continuum of measure one, we can write the consumer surplus associated with good g
in country z as:
CSgz (p
g
z) = u
g
z[d
g
z(p
g
z)]  pgzdgz(pgz) (3)
On the supply side, as in Horn et al. (2010), labour (`) is the only factor of production which
is employed in the production of the numéraire good that is produced one-for-one from labor. The
supply of labor is assumed to be large enough that the numéraire good is always produced in
a positive amount; therefore the equilibrium wage is equal to one. Each non-numéraire good is
produced from labor with diminishing returns. In particular, we assume the following production
function for non-numéraire good g in country z: Qgz =
p
2gz`g, where Q
g
z is the production of good
g in country z and `g is the labor employed in the production of good g. The supply function of
good g in country z is as follows:
sgz(q
g
z) = 
g
zq
g
z (4)
where qqz denotes the producer price for good g in country z.
We assume the following comparative advantage structure across countries: Ii = 
J
j = 
K
k = 1
while Ji = 
K
i = 1+i; 
I
j = 
K
j = 1+j and 
I
k = 
J
k = 1+k. In other words, each country has
a comparative advantage in two goods while having a comparative disadvantage in the other good:
each country imports the good that is indexed by the same uppercase letter as the identity of the
country. For example, country i imports good I while exporting good J to country j and good K
to country k. Thus, there are two competing exporters for each non-numéraire good. Country zs
producer surplus in good g as follows:
PSgz (q
g
z) =
Z
sgz(q
g
z)dq
g
z =
1
2
gz(q
g
z)
2 (5)
Due to the absence of any tari¤ in country i on goods J and K, the consumer and producer
prices of goods J and K in country i are equal: qJi = p
J
i and q
K
i = p
K
i . As there is no domestic
taxation for the import competing sector, producer and consumer prices are also equal in this
sector: qIi = p
I
i .
As a representative scenario for all goods and countries, consider good I (i.e. the good in which
country i is has a comparative disadvantage). Let tij be the tari¤ imposed by country i on its
imports of good I from country j. Ruling out prohibitive tari¤s yields the following no-arbitrage
conditions for good I:
pIi = p
I
j + tij = p
I
k + tik (6)
Let mIi be country is imports of good I:
mIi = d(p
I
i )  sIi (pIi ) =   2pIi (7)
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Each countrys exports of a good must equal its domestic supply of that good minus its local
consumption:
xIj = (1 + j)p
I
j   [  pIj ] and xIk = (1 + k)pIk   [  pIk] (8)
Market clearing for good I requires that country is imports equal the total exports of the other
two countries:
mIi =
X
z 6=i
xIz (9)
Equations (6) through (9) imply that the equilibrium prices of good I in the importing country
i and an exporting country (say J) equal:
pIi =
3+
X
z 6=i
tiz(2 + z)
(j + k + 6)
and pIj =
3+ tik(k + 2)  tij(k + 4)
(j + k + 6)
(10)
As it is clear from equation (10), the price of good I in country i increases in its tari¤s (pass
through e¤ect) and decreases in the degree of comparative advantage of the other two countries
(supply e¤ect). The e¤ect of a countrys tari¤ on its terms of trade (say tij on country j) is evident
from equation (10): only 2+j(j+k+6) < 1 of a given increase in either of its tari¤s is passed on to
domestic consumers with exactly (k+4)(j+k+6) < 1 of the increase falling on the shoulders of country
js exporters.
Using the above prices, nding the export of each country is straightforward:
xIj =
(2 + j) [3+ tik(k + 2)  tij(k + 4)]
(j + k + 6)
  
Note that the export of country j to country i (xIj ) rises with the degree of comparative advantage
country j (j) and the tari¤ the rival exporter faces (tik) while it falls with the degree of comparative
advantage of the rival exporter (k) and the tari¤ it itself faces in country i (tij).
From a welfare perspective, given the partial equilibrium nature of the model, it su¢ ces to
consider only protected goods. A countrys welfare is dened as the sum of consumer surplus,
producer surplus, and tari¤ revenue over all such goods:
wz =
X
g
CSgz +
X
g
PSgz +
X
z 6=h
tzhx
Z
h (11)
Using equations (6) through (10) one can easily obtain welfare of country i as a function of the
degrees of comparative advantage and tari¤s.
2.1 Optimal Tari¤s (su¢ ciently high bound tari¤s)
Before describing optimal tari¤s, let country is welfare as a function of trade regime r be denoted
by wi(r) and let wi(r   v) denote the di¤erence between country is welfare under trade regimes
r and v: wi(r   v)  wi(r) wi(v). First, we assume that bound tari¤s are su¢ ciently high and
countries are not constrained in imposing their optimal tari¤s under all possible trade regimes (i.e.
there exists a tari¤ binding overhang under all trade regimes).
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2.1.1 No agreement (empty network)
To examine the interaction between the external tari¤s of a country, for now, we allow countries
to be able to discriminate and later impose the MFN constraint. At the empty network ?, we nd
that tari¤s are strategic complements:
@2wi (?)
@tij@tik
=
2(j + 2)(k + 2)(j + k + 7)
(j + k + 6)2
> 0
In other words, an increase (decrease) in external tari¤ on one exporter raises the incentive to
impose higher (lower) external tari¤ on the other exporter. The intuition is as follows. As country
i imposes higher tari¤ on country j, export supply of country k into country i becomes less elastic
and thus the tari¤ on country k also rises.
When countries are not constrained by the multilaterally negotiated tari¤bindings, each country
i chooses a non-discriminatory tari¤ (in accordance with GATT Article I) ti = tij = tik to maximize
its welfare:
ti (?) = Argmaxwi(?) =
(j + k)
(j + k + 4)(j + k + 8)
(12)
Note that ti (?) rises with the degrees of comparative advantage of the exporters (j and k). Next,
we examine how an FTA formation a¤ects membersexternal tari¤s.
2.1.2 Free Trade Agreements
When countries are not constrained by the multilaterally negotiated bound tari¤ rates, upon FTA
formation, member countries remove their internal tari¤s on each other and impose their individ-
ually optimal external tari¤ on the non-member. Under a single FTA between i and j we have
tij = tji = 0 and the optimal external tari¤ of country i on the non-member country k is given
by:10
tik(ij)  Argmaxwi(ij) = (j + k + 8)(k   j) + k
(k + 2)[(j + 3)(j + k + 7) + 1]
(13)
As indicated above, the model exhibits tari¤complementarity so that the formation of a bilateral
FTA induces each member to lower its tari¤ on the non-member country relative to the status quo:
tik(?   ij) = ti (?)   tik(ij) > 0. This tari¤ complementarity becomes deeper as the degree
of comparative advantage of the FTA partner rises and the one of the non-member country falls:
@tik(? ij)
@j
> 0 while @tik(? ij)@k < 0.
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We next proceed as follows. First, we focus on the scenario where countries are completely
symmetric with respect to their degrees of comparative advantage. Within this scenario, we em-
ploy an endogenous FTA formation game in which each country is free to pursue either no trade
10Since the non-member country is the sole importer of the good exported by the member countries, we have
tk (?) = tk (ij). In a hub-spoke network where i is the hub, we have tjk (ih) = tjk (ij) and tkj (ih) = tkj (ik). In
contrast, since the hub has an FTA with both spokes, it practices free trade.
11See Bagwell and Staiger (1997a, 1997b, 1999) and Saggi and Yildiz (2009) for a detailed discussion of the tari¤
complementarity e¤ect and Estevadeordal et. al. (2008) for empirical evidence in its support. It is worth noting
that tari¤ complementarity also arises in simple general equilibrium models of trade agreements such as Bond et. al.
(2004).
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liberalization or bilateral trade liberalization or multilateral free trade.12 Our objective is to isolate
the consequences of the interaction of the multilateral reduction in bound tari¤ rates and FTA
formation in achieving global free trade. To this end, we assume that multilaterally negotiated
bound tari¤ rates are exogenously given and countries are constrained by these bound rates in
setting their optimum external tari¤s, i.e. a country can not raise its tari¤ to a higher level than its
bound rate. Under such an environment, we examine the coalition proof Nash equilibrium agree-
ments of the FTA formation game for all possible levels of bound tari¤ rates. Then, we extend our
analysis to two di¤erent settings: (i) where countries are asymmetric with respect to their degree
of comparative advantage and (ii) where countries are symmetric while PTA under consideration
is a customs union.
3 Endogenous trade agreements
We now describe our game of preferential trade liberalization. In the rst stage, each country
simultaneously announces the names of countries with whom it wants to sign an FTA. Let 
r
denote the announcement prole that leads to regime r. Country is announcement is denoted by
i and its strategy set Si consists of four possible announcements:
Si = ff; g; fj; g; f; kg; fj; kgg
where f; g denotes an announcement in favor of no FTA with either trading partners, fj; g in
favor of an FTA with only country j; f; kg in favor of an FTA with only country k; and fj; kg in
favor of FTAs with both of them.
It is important to note that we employ a game of announcements or proposals. In our game, a
country does not announce in favor of a specic trade agreement but rather names partners with
whom it wants to form such agreements. Since a trade agreement requires consent from both sides,
the mapping between various announcements proles that occurs and the types of trade agreements
that countries can form are as follows:
(i) No two announcements match or the only matching announcements are f; g. Such an-
nouncement proles 
? yield No agreement ? under which all countries impose their optimal Nash
tari¤s on one another as long as they are not constrained by the multilateral bound tari¤ rates
(optimal MFN tari¤ falls below the bound rates). If they are constrained, they are required to
apply the exogenously given bound tari¤ rates.
(ii) Two countries announce each othersname and there is no other matching announcement:
i.e., j 2 i and i 2 j while i =2 k and/or k =2 i and j =2 k and/or k =2 j . All of these
announcement proles 
ij yield an FTA between countries i and j denoted by hiji under which
members impose zero tari¤s on each other and the optimal external tari¤ tik(ij) and tjk(ij) on
the non-member if these tari¤s fall below the bound rates. Otherwise, they apply the exogenously
given bound tari¤ rates.
12Since all countries have market power in our model, allowing for unilateral liberalization is not necessary: no
country will choose to pursue such liberalization in our model.
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(iii) Country i announces in favor of signing an FTA with countries j and k while countries j
and/or k announce only in favor of signing an FTA with country i: i.e. j 2 i and i 2 j and k 2 i
and i 2 k while k =2 j and/or j =2 k. This set of announcement proles 
ih yields a pair of
independent FTAs (i.e. a hub and spoke trading regime) with i is the common member denoted by
hij; iki (or simply hihi) under which countries j and k impose the tari¤ tjk(ih) and tkj(ih) on each
other if these tari¤s fall below the bound rates while practicing free trade with the hub country i.
As before, if tjk(ih) and tkj(ih) exceed the bound rates, spoke countries impose these bound tari¤
rates on each other.
(iv) All countries announce each othersnames. The corresponding announcement prole 
F
yields global free trade, denoted by hF i, under which all countries eliminate their tari¤s on each
other.
Note that since an FTA between two countries can arise only if it is mutually acceptable to both
sides, multiple announcement proles can map into the same agreement. For example, the FTA
hiji obtains when (i) countries i and j call only each other, regardless of the nature of country ks
announcement: if i = fj; g and j = fi; g, then hiji obtains for all four possible announcements
on the part of country k, i.e., for kff; g, fi; g, f; jg, fi; jgg so that country ks announcement
has no bearing upon the outcome when neither of the other two countriesannounce its name; (ii)
countries i and j announce each others name and either one or both of them also announce country
k but country k does not reciprocate: i = fj; kg and j = fi; g but i =2 k or i = fj; g and
j = fi; kg but j =2 k or i = fj; kg and j = fi; kg but i; j =2 k.
3.1 Symmetric Comparative Advantage
Throughout the remainder of this section, we maintain the following complete symmetry assump-
tion:13
Assumption 1:
z =  for all z = i; j; k: (symmetry)
Under symmetry, when countries are not constrained by the bound tari¤ rate, each country
imposes a non-discriminatory tari¤ on its trading partners: tz (?) = t?, for all z = i; j; k and due
to market segmentation the non-member country under a bilateral FTA (say hiji) imposes the same
external tari¤ on the member countries as the one under No agreement: tki (ij) = tkj (ij) = t?
where
t? =

2(+ 2)(+ 4)
where z = i; j; k
Similarly, when member countries under a bilateral FTA (say hiji) and spoke countries under
a hub and spoke regime (say hihi) are not bound, their optimal external tari¤s are as follows:
tik (ij) = tjk (ij) = tjk (ih) = tkj (ih) = t
f where
13Calculations supporting the results reported in this section as well as the rest of the paper are contained in the
appendix.
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tf =

(+ 2)(22 + 13+ 22)
3.1.1 Di¤erent Tari¤ Binding Scenarios - Symmetry
Let  denote the bound tari¤ rate resulting from multilateral negotiations and countries are not
allowed to raise their tari¤s to a higher level than their bound rates. Thus, given the above optimal
tari¤s and feasible bound rates, we have three possible scenarios (illustrated in Figure 1):
(i) no tari¤ binding scenario where the bound tari¤ rate exceeds the optimal tari¤ under No
agreement:  > tz (?) so that countries are free to impose their optimal tari¤s under all trade
regimes;
(ii) partial tari¤ binding scenario where the bound tari¤ rate exceeds the optimal tari¤ under
an FTA but falls below the optimal tari¤ under No agreement: tf <  < t?. Under such a case,
countries under ? and the non-member country under an FTA impose the bound rate  while the
member countries under an FTA and spoke countries under a hub and spoke regime are free to
impose their optimal external tari¤s and
(iii) full tari¤ binding scenario where the bound tari¤ rate below the optimal tari¤ under an
FTA:  < tf . Under this scenario, countries lose their freedom to impose optimal tari¤s under all
trade regimes and apply their bound tari¤ rates (no tari¤ binding overhang).
- Insert Figure 1 -
3.1.2 Equilibrium Trade Agreements- Symmetry
Before deriving equilibrium agreements, we report a useful lemma that is easy to establish:
Lemma 1: Under symmetry, we have:
(i) wi(ij ?) = wj(ij ?) > 0 for all  and  while wk(ij ?) > 0 only when  > ()
where tf < () < t?;
(ii) wk(F   ij) > 0 for all  and ;
(iii) wi(ih) > maxfwi(F ); wi(ij); wi(?)g and wj(F   ih) = wk(F   ih) > 0 for all  and ;
(iv) wj(ih  ik) = wk(ih  ij) > 0 only when  < () where tf < () < t? and
(v) () > () for all .
The rst part of the above lemma implies that, a pair of symmetric countries under ? always
have an incentive to form a bilateral FTA and thus neither member country (i or j) has an incentive
to unilaterally break its FTA link since doing so only leads to no agreement ?, under which its
welfare is lower. Part (i) also informs us that the formation of a bilateral FTA makes the non-
member country better-o¤ only when the bound tari¤ rate is su¢ ciently high:  > (). Thus,
when  > () holds, we argue that the formation of a bilateral FTA is Pareto improving. Here
it is important to note that, relative to no agreement ?, the benet from staying outsider under
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a bilateral FTA gets weaker as bound tari¤s fall since it restricts the ability of the non-member
country to impose its optimal tari¤ and it completely disappears when  < () holds. Therefore,
when  < () holds, the formation of an FTA makes member countries better o¤ at the expense
of the non-member.
Similar discussion applies to the second part of the above Lemma. We rst note that no
symmetric country has incentive to unilaterally break its link with both partners that leads to a
deviation from multilateral free trade to an FTA in which it itself is not a member provided that
countries are free to impose their optimal tari¤s as under the no tari¤ binding scenario. As the
bound tari¤ rates fall, this unilateral incentive gets even weaker since it restricts the ability of the
non-member country to impose its optimal tari¤. Part (iii) says that the hub country i under
hihi is better o¤ relative to free trade hF i while each spoke country is worse o¤. Note that the
hub country i enjoys privileged access in both spoke countries under hihi neither spoke country
imposes a tari¤ on the hub country whereas both impose external tari¤s on each other. As a result
of this favorable treatment, country i is strictly better o¤ under hihi relative to hF i. To see why
the spokes are worse o¤ under hihi relative to hF i, rst note that aggregate global welfare is strictly
higher under hF i relative to hihi. Since the hub is strictly better o¤ under hihi relative to hF i and
welfare of the two spoke countries is equal due to symmetry, both spokes must be worse o¤ under
hihi relative to hF i.
Furthermore, part (iii) also informs us that the welfare of a hub country is higher than that of
the member of a single bilateral FTA (and thus the under no agreement due to part (i)). Starting
from a single FTA, the hub countrys second FTA lowers the domestic welfare and raises the export
surplus due to the privileged access in another country and the latter e¤ect dominates the former
regardless of the bound tari¤ rates. Part (iv) of the above Lemma implies that a spoke country has
an incentive to revoke its FTA with the hub and become an outsider facing an FTA between the
other two countries unless the bound tari¤ rates are su¢ ciently low. When the bound tari¤ rates
are su¢ ciently low ( < ()), the non-member countrys ability to impose optimal MFN tari¤ is
restricted and staying outside an FTA becomes less attractive.
The above discussion in parts (ii) and (iii) argues that free riding incentives do not play any
role for the equilibrium condition for free trade. One question remains to be answered: do countries
have incentives to jointly exclude a country from free trade network?
Proposition 1a (exclusion incentive-symmetry): Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Even
though there exist no free riding incentives, exclusion incentive arises when bound tari¤ rates are
su¢ ciently low: wi(F   ij) = wj(F   ij) < 0 when 0 <  < b() where tf < b() < t?.
The above proposition establishes the existence of an exclusion incentive when bound tari¤ rates
are su¢ ciently low: under such a case, a pair of countries prefer a bilateral FTA to free trade. The
forces that give rise to the exclusion incentive can be understood as follows. First note that when
countries are free to set their optimal tari¤s as under the no tari¤ binding scenario ( > tz (?)),
exclusion incentive does not exist and wi(F   ij) > 0 holds. Relative to free trade, each member
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country of an FTA has the ability to manipulate its terms of trade vis-à-vis the non-member while
facing optimal Nash tari¤s in the non-members market. As the bound tari¤ rates fall below tz (?),
the non-member country loses its ability to set its optimal MFN tari¤ under a bilateral FTA and
is required to impose the bound tari¤ rate that is lower than the optimal MFN tari¤ rate while the
member countries are fully able to impose their optimal external tari¤ (as under the partial tari¤
binding scenario). Thus, wi(F ij) declines as  falls andwi(F ij) = 0 obtains when  = b().
As  falls below b(), we nd that a pair of countries benet if they can successfully exclude the
third country from free trade network. Note from part (ii) of Lemma 1 that the exclusion incentive
exists at the expense of the excluded country.
Using Lemma 1, we can show that the Nash equilibria of the FTA game are as follows:
Proposition 2 (Symmetry-Nash): Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, the following an-
nouncement proles are Nash equilibrium of the FTA game:
(i) 
?  fi = f; g; j = f; g; k = f; gg leading to ? for all  and ;
(ii) 
ij  fi = fj; g; j = fi; g; k = f; gg leading to hiji for all  and ;
(iii) 
F  fi = fj; kg; j = fi; kg; k = fi; jgg leading to hF i for all  and  while
(iv) 
ih  fi = fj; kg; j = fi; g; k = fi; gg leading to hihi is a Nash equilibrium only
when  < ().
The logic behind Proposition 1 is as follows. It is straightforward that the announcement prole

? is a Nash equilibrium since no country has an incentive to announce anothers name if the latter
does not announce its name in return. Next consider 
ij . Note from part (i) of Lemma 1 that
neither member country (i or j) has an incentive to unilaterally change its announcement from
that which it makes under 
ij since doing so only leads to no agreement ?, under which its welfare
is lower. Similarly, given that neither country i nor country k announces its name, country k has
no incentive to alter its announcement from k = f; g since doing so has no bearing on the
resulting trade agreement. Thus, the announcement prole 
ij yielding a bilateral FTA is a Nash
equilibrium.
Now consider the announcement prole 
F that yields global free trade hF i. Parts (ii) and (iii)
of Lemma 1 together imply that a country (say k) has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from its
announcement fi; jg since doing so alters the trade regime from from hF i to hiji or hihi or hjhi
under which it is worse o¤. Therefore, the announcement prole 
F that yields global free trade
hF i is always a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, consider the announcement prole 
ih associated with the hub and spoke regime hihi.
First note from part (iii) of Lemma 1 that, the hub country i has no incentive to unilaterally change
its announcement from fj; kg to fj; g or f; kg or f; g since doing so translates into a deviation
from the hub and spoke regime hihi where i is the hub country to hiji or hiki or ? respectively.
Now consider the unilateral incentive of a spoke country to deviate from 
ih. Part (iv) of Lemma 1
states that, only when  > () holds, either spoke country (say j) has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate from its announcement fi; g to f; g since this deviation translates into a deviation from
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hihi where j is a spoke country to hiki where j is a non-member country. As a result, when   ()
holds, neither the hub nor the spokes have an incentive to unilaterally alter their announcements
from 
ih so that hub and spoke regime hihi is indeed supported by a announcement prole that
constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the FTA game.
It is immediate to note from Proposition 1 that there is a unique announcement prole that
supports each agreement as a Nash equilibrium and that the prole itself is the most parsimonious
one. For example, even though fi = f; jg; j = f; g; k = f; gg also maps to ?, such an
announcement prole does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. To see why, simply note that given
these announcements, country j has an incentive to alter its announcement from j = f; g to
j = fi; g in order to form the bilateral FTA hiji. Similarly, it is worth considering briey as
to why fi = fj; g; j = fi; g; k = fi; gg is not a Nash equilibrium prole even though, just as
the announcement prole 
ij , its maps into the FTA hiji. Under this announcement prole, given
the announcements of countries j and k, as per part (iii) of Lemma 1, country i has an incentive
to alter its announcement to i = fj; kg so as to obtain the trade agreement hihi under which it
is the hub. Using analogous reasoning, we can rule out all other non-parsimonious announcements
as candidates for Nash equilibria.
Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria To deal with the multiplicity problem and to capture the
process of FTA formation in a more realistic fashion, we rene the set of Nash equilibria by isolating
those Nash equilibria that are coalition proof. Bernheim et al. (1987) state that in an important
class of noncooperative environments, it is natural to assume that players can freely discuss
their strategies, but cannot make binding commitments. In such cases, any meaningful agreement
between the players must be self-enforcing. Although the Nash best-response property is a necessary
condition for self-enforceability, it is not su¢ cient - it is in general possible for coalitions to arrange
plausible, mutually benecial deviations from Nash agreements. Allowing countries to discuss
their strategies regarding which trade agreements they intend to form is eminently desirable in the
present context since countries considering bilateral trade agreements certainly have the capacity to
communicate with one another without necessarily having the ability to make binding commitments
regarding their future plans. Following Bernheim et al. (1987): ... an agreement is coalition-
proof if and only if it is Pareto e¢ cient within the class of self-enforcing agreements. In turn, an
agreement is self-enforcing if and only if no proper subset (coalition) of players, taking the actions
of its complement as xed, can agree to deviate in a way that makes all of its members better o¤.
Therefore, a coalition proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) is immune to all self-enforcing coalitional
deviations.
Which, if any, of the Nash equilibrium announcement proles described above are CPNE? We
begin by considering whether the announcement prole 
F that leads to global free trade hF i is a
CPNE. Since world welfare is the highest under hF i, each country prefers hF i to ? and thus we
can immediately rule out any coalitional announcement deviations that would lead to a deviation
from hF i to ?. Similarly, we know from part (iii) of Lemma 1 that no two countries (say j and
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k) have incentives to jointly alter their announcements from fi; kg to fi; g and fi; jg to fi; g,
respectively since doing so would lead to a deviation from hF i to hihi where both are spokes (and
spokes are worse of relative to free trade).
Finally, taking the announcement of their complement (country k) xed, consider the joint
deviation of two countries (say i and j) from their announcements fj; kg and fi; kg to fj; g
and fi; g respectively. This joint deviation implies a coalitional deviation from free trade hF i
to a bilateral FTA hiji. From Proposition 1 we know that, taking the announcement of their
complement (country k) xed at k = fi; jg, the above coalitional deviation in announcements
would occur when  < () holds. The question then becomes whether this joint deviation is
self-enforcing. The next proposition argues that it is not :
Proposition 1b (unexercised exclusion incentive): Suppose Assumption 1 holds and  <b() holds. Then, even though a pair of countries benet from excluding the third country from their
own free trade network, the lure of becoming hub under a hub and spoke regime and the exibility
that FTA members have to pursue such an arrangement yield that such incentive goes unexercised
in the equilibrium.
The intuition behind the above proposition is as follows. When  < b() holds, two countries
(say i and j) have incentives to jointly deviate from their free trade announcements fj; kg and fi; kg
to fj; g and fi; g respectively. Note that taking the announcement of the excluded country as
given k = fi; jg, we know from Lemma 1 part (iii) that country i has an incentive to alter its
announcement fj; g to fj; kg further in order to create the trading regime hihi where it becomes
the hub. Similarly, country j has an incentive to alter its announcement fi; g to fi; kg so as to
itself become the hub. Thus, the initial coalitional announcement deviations that can cause free
trade hF i to be replaced by the bilateral FTA hiji is not self-enforcing. The key message of this
result is that even though a pair of countries benet from excluding the third country from their
trade agreement, they are unable to exercise this exclusion incentive in equilibrium.
The above discussion and propositions together imply that there exists no unilateral and self
enforcing coalitional incentives to deviate from the announcement prole 
F and thus the following
result obtains:
Proposition 2 (Symmetry-CPNE): Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, the announcement
prole leading to hF i is CPNE for all  and .
As in Saggi and Yildiz (2010), the above result implies that if global trade liberalization were
to confer equal gains upon all countries (which is what happens when countries are completely
symmetric), the pursuit of FTAs is compatible with the goal of achieving global free trade. Unlike
Saggi and Yildiz (2010), we go one step further and obtain this result for all possible bound tari¤
rates. The exible nature of FTAs plays a crucial role in ensuring that the exclusion incentive goes
unexercised in the FTA game: the lure of a hub and spoke trading arrangement ends up delivering
free trade as a CPNE of the FTA game.
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Next, we consider whether the announcement proles that lead to the other agreements are
CPNE. First, consider no agreement ?. Note from Lemma 1 part (i) that any two countries (say
i and j) have an incentive to coalitionally change their announcements from f; g and f; g to
fj; g and fi; g respectively, taking country ks announcement xed: k = f; g. This initial
deviation is self-enforcing since no proper subset of the initially deviating countries (neither i nor
j) has an incentive to alter its announcement unilaterally (i.e. announcement prole that leads to
hiji is a Nash equilibrium). Therefore, the announcement prole that leads to ? is not a CPNE.
Is the announcement prole that leads to a hub and spoke regime (say hihi) a CPNE? Note
from part (iii) of Lemma 1 that countries j and k have an incentive to coalitionally change their
announcements from fi; g and fi; g to fi; kg and fi; jg respectively, taking country is announce-
ment xed at i = fj; kg. This coalitional deviation would convert the hub and spoke regime hihi
to free trade hF i. Furthermore, this initial coalitional deviation is self-enforcing since no proper
subset of the initially deviating countries (neither j nor k) has an incentive to further unilaterally
deviate since hF i is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the announcement prole that leads to a hub
and spoke regime is not a CPNE.
Finally, we examine whether the announcement prole that leads to a bilateral FTA hiji is a
CPNE. From parts (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 1 we know that, taking country js announcement xed
at j = fi; g, countries i and k have an incentive to coalitionally change their announcements
from fj; g and f; g to fj; kg and fi; g respectively when  < () holds. This initial coalitional
deviation would convert FTA hiji to the hub and spoke regime hihi where i is the hub and j and k are
spokes. Furthermore, when  < () holds, this initial coalitional deviation is self-enforcing since
no proper subset of the initially deviating countries (neither i nor k) has an incentive to unilaterally
alter its announcement since the announcement prole that leads to hihi is a Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, all three countries have incentives to jointly deviate from their announcements 
ij to 
F
when  > b() holds and this coalitional deviation is self enforcing since no proper subset of the
initially deviating countries has an incentive to deviate further. Combining these two self enforcing
deviations with part (iv) of Lemma 1, it is immediate that the announcement prole that leads
to a bilateral FTA is a CPNE only when ()    b() holds and under such a case we have
multiple CPNE and theory o¤ers no guidance which of these equilibria would arise.
Given Proposition 2, it is natural to ask: under what circumstances, if any, free trade fails to be
a CPNE? We show next that such a possibility arises (only) when countries are asymmetric with
respect to their comparative advantage.
4 Asymmetric Comparative Advantage
From hereon, we drop the assumption that the degrees of comparative advantages are symmetric
across countries. In what follows, the size of a country is measured by the degree of comparative
advantage in the exporting sectors, translating directly into asymmetries of volume of exports.
In other words, since the model is partial equilibrium in nature and lacks any income e¤ects,
an increase in a countrys degree of comparative advantage in this model increases its exports
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of non-numéraire/protected goods. Since import demand functions are symmetric, the larger the
comparative advantage of the other countries in their exporting goods, the larger the import volume
of a country. Thus, the smaller exporting countries are also the larger importing countries. It is
worth emphasizing that in our model no country is a price taker on world markets in fact each
country is the unique importer of a single good and therefore has market power that it can exploit
via an external tari¤.
How does the asymmetry a¤ect the preferences of countries for trade agreement formation?
4.1 Two larger one smaller exporters
To highlight the role played by asymmetric comparative advantage, it proves instructive to consider
a scenario where two countries (largerexporting countries denoted by l and l0) have higher degrees
of comparative advantages in their exporting sectors than the third (denoted by s; refereed to as
the smallerexporting country).14 Accordingly, let the pattern of asymmetry be given by:15
Assumption 2:
  s < l = l0 =  (14)
Here it is important to note from (13) that, in order to guarantee non-negative tari¤s, we assume
that the degree of asymmetry is not very large: s   =
p
2 + 8+ 25  5.
The following lemma informs us how the incentive of a larger exporting country to form an
FTA depends on the degree of comparative advantage of the smaller trading partner:
Lemma 2: Let country s be an FTA partner of country l under regime r but not under regime
v. Then, the following holds: @wl(r v)@s < 0.
The intuition underlying the inequality @wl(r v)@s < 0 is as follows. The weaker the comparative
advantage of a smaller exporting country, the larger the increase in the export surplus of larger
importing country as an FTA partner from the elimination of its smaller partners optimal tari¤
and the smaller the loss due to its own trade liberalization since the tari¤ reduction applies to a
smaller volume of imports (due to the smaller export capacity of its partner). This immediately
implies that a larger exporting country prefers to form a bilateral FTA with the smaller of its two
trading partners:
wl(sl)  wl(ll0) (15)
From hereon, let i(r  v) denotes the critical degree of comparative advantage of country s at
which country i is indi¤erent between regimes r and v.
14As noted earlier, in our model no country is small in the traditional sense since all three can inuence their
terms of trade. Hence we use the word smalleras opposed to small.
15 In the next section, we show that our results extend to the case where there are two smaller and one larger
exporters.
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4.1.1 Di¤erent Tari¤ Binding Scenarios - Asymmetry
The optimal tari¤s reported above in section 2 combined with Assumption 2 leads to the following
ranking of the optimal tari¤s under all feasible trade regimes, assuming that bound tari¤ rates do
not bind:16
ts(?) > tl(?) > tll0(sl) > tsl0(sl) > tls(ll0) > 0
As before, let  denote the bound tari¤ rate. Given the above ranking, "no tari¤ binding" and
"full tari¤ binding" scenarios are similar to the one under complete symmetry while the partial
tari¤ binding scenario has four distinct sub-scenarios as illustrated in Figure 2:
(i) no tari¤ binding scenario arises when  > ts (?) holds. Under such a case, all countries are
free to impose their optimal tari¤s under all feasible trade regimes (tari¤ binding overhang under
all regimes).
(ii) partial tari¤ binding scenarios:
- tl(?) <  < ts(?): except for country s under ? and as a non-member under the bilateral
FTA hll0i, countries are free to impose their optimal tari¤s under all feasible trade regimes. Country
s under ? and hll0i is constrained to impose the bound tari¤ rate  .
- tll0(sl) <  < tl(?): countries under ? (and non-member countries under a bilateral FTA)
are constrained to impose their bound tari¤ rates while FTA member countries are free to impose
their optimal tari¤s.
- tsl0(sl) <  < tll0(sl): countries under ? (and non-member countries under a bilateral FTA)
and larger member country under hsli or hsl0i (and as a spoke under hshi) are constrained to impose
their bound tari¤ rates while the other FTA member countries are free to impose their optimal
tari¤s.
- tls(ll0) <  < tsl0(sl): except for the member countries under hll0i (and larger spoke country
under hlhi), countries are constrained to impose their bound tari¤ rates.
(iii) full tari¤ binding scenario arises when  < tls(ll0) holds. Under this scenario, all countries
lose their freedom to impose optimal tari¤s under the entire set of trade regimes and they are
required to apply their bound tari¤ rates (no tari¤ binding overhang).
- Insert Figure 2 -
4.1.2 Preferences for FTAs under Asymmetry
To avoid redundancy, we focus directly on free trade and examine when free trade is a CPNE under
the scenario with asymmetric comparative advantage. To this end, we rst state the following
lemma that is useful in deriving the CPNE condition for free trade:
16Note that, due to market segmentation, the following holds: ts(?) = tsl(ll0); tl(?) = tls(sl0); tll0(sl) = tll0(sh);
tsl0(sl) = tsl0(lh) and tls(ll
0) = tls(l0h).
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Lemma 3: Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Then, we have
(i) wl(sl ?) > 0; wl(F  ) > 0; wl(F  sl0) > 0; wl(F  sh) > 0 and wl(F   l0h) > 0
for all  ,  and s and
(ii) wl(lh  ll0) > 0 and ws(sh  sl) > 0 for all  ,  and s.
The rst part of the above lemma is an extension Lemma 1 into an asymmetric setting for large
countries. Note that since wl(F   sl0) > 0; wl(F   sh) > 0 and wl(F   l0h) > 0 for all  , 
and s, a larger exporting country has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from its announcement
that leads to free trade. Lemma 3 implies that the only announcement deviation a larger exporting
country (say l) would participate is the joint deviation with the other larger exporting country
(country l0) or with the smaller exporting country (country s) from their announcements that lead
to free trade to announcements that lead to a bilateral FTA between each other. However, even
when such incentives exist, it is immediate from part (ii) of the above Lemma that they are not self-
enforcing sincewl(lh ll0) > 0 andws(sh sl) > 0 always hold. To see it more clearly, taking the
announcement of country s as given, consider the joint deviation of two larger exporting countries
from their respective announcements l = fs; l0g and l0 = fs; lg to l = f; l0g and l0 = f; lg
leading to deviation from hF i to hll0i. Such deviation happens only when s > l(F   ll0). In
other words, two larger exporting countries have incentives to jointly exclude the small exporting
country only when the degree of comparative advantage asymmetry is su¢ ciently small. However,
since wl(lh  ll0) > 0 always holds, taking the announcement of country s as given: s = fl; l0g,
either of the initially deviating larger exporting countries (say country l) has incentive to further
deviate from l = f; l0g to l = fs; l0g to become the hub country under hlhi. As a result, the
initial announcement deviation is not self enforcing. Similarly, since ws(sh  sl) > 0 always holds
as well, the same logic applies for the coalitional announcement deviations of country s and one
of the larger exporting countries to exclude the other larger exporting country. Even when such
deviation occurs, it is not a self-enforcing one since country s has an incentive to further deviate
to become a hub country. Then, the following result is an immediate extension of Propositions 1a
and 1b into the asymmetric setting:
Proposition 3 (exclusion incentive-asymmetry): Suppose Assumption 2 holds. While
exclusion incentives arise, the exibility that FTA members have in forming an additional FTA
yields that such incentive goes unexercised in the equilibrium.
Lemma 3 and Proposition 3 together imply that there exists no self-enforcing coalitional de-
viation in which a larger exporting country is involved. As a result, the unilateral announcement
deviation of the smaller country from 
F is pivotal for 
F for being a CPNE. Thus, we have to
consider the following two unilateral deviations of country s:
(i) unilateral announcement deviation of country s from s = fl; l0g to s = fl; g (or s =
f; l0g) leading to deviation from hF i to hlhi (or hl0hi).
(ii) unilateral announcement deviation of country s from s = fl; l0g to s = f; g leading to
deviation from hF i to hll0i.
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Consider the unilateral deviation (i) rst. We know from our previous discussion that, when
countries are completely symmetric, no country has an incentive to unilaterally deviate irrespective
of the bound tari¤ rates. However, the asymmetry in comparative advantages leads to asymmetric
preferences for trade liberalization. We can easily show that, due to the smaller volume of its
exports, country s benets less from tari¤ reductions granted by a larger exporting country and
it loses relatively more from eliminating its own optimal tari¤ since it applies to relatively larger
import volumes and thus we can show that @ws(F lh)@s > 0 always holds. We nd that there exists
a critical threshold degree of asymmetry beyond which country s has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate from its free trade announcement s = fl; l0g to s = fl; g (or s = f; l0g) leading to
deviation from hF i to hlhi (or hl0hi):
ws(F   lh) < 0 when s < s(F   lh) where @s(F   lh)
@
> 0
The above result argues that the incentive of country s to unilaterally deviate from s = fl; l0g
to s = fl; g (or s = f; l0g) gets weaker as the multilaterally negotiated bound tari¤ rates fall.
Now, consider the unilateral deviation (ii). First, we should note that a similar intuitive discus-
sion applies as above and we nd that, when country s is su¢ ciently smaller exporter, the benet
from being able to impose import tari¤s dominates the benet from free market access and thus it
has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its free trade announcement s = fl; l0g to s = f; g
leading to deviation from hF i to hll0i:
ws(F   ll0) < 0 when s < s(F   ll0) where @s(F   ll
0)
@
> 0
Two observations leads to our main result: (i) s(F   ll0) > s(F   lh) and thus the incentive of
country s to unilaterally deviate from s = fl; l0g to s = f; g leading to deviation from hF i to
hll0i determines the CPNE condition for hF i and (ii) since @s(F ll0)@ > 0, the incentive of country
s to unilaterally deviate from free trade announcement and free ride under hll0i gets weaker as the
bound tari¤ rates fall. We can now state our main result that is illustrated in Figure 3:
Proposition 4: Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then, 
F  fs = fl; l0g; l = fs; l0g; l0 = fs; lgg
leading to hF i is CPNE only when s  s(F   ll0) and it is more likely to be a CPNE as bound
tari¤ rates fall.
- Insert Figure 3-
Based on the above discussion, as countries negotiate lower bound tari¤ rates, it disciplines the
ability of the smaller exporting (and thus larger importing) country in imposing external tari¤s
and thus weakens its incentive to free ride on trade liberalization by the larger exporting countries.
Therefore, free riding incentive falls as bound tari¤ rates decline. Since FTA formation is exible
in signing independent FTAs and exclusion incentives go unexercised, it is the free riding incentive
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that determines the CPNE condition for multilateral free trade. The above nding suggests that
multilateral free trade is more likely to be a CPNE as the multilateral negotiated bound tari¤ rates
decline. Therefore, this result provides support for the idea that multilateral trade liberalization
acts as a complement to the FTA formation in achieving global free trade: FTA formation is more
likely to act as a building bloc when it is accompanied with lower bound tari¤ rates.
Next, we examine the following question: what if s < s(F   ll0) and global free trade fails
to obtain? First, consider no agreement ?. Since wl(ll0   ?) > 0 for all  ,  and s, two
larger exporting countries (l and l0) have an incentive to coalitionally change their announcements
from f; g and f; g to f; l0g and f; lg respectively, taking country ss announcement xed:
s = f; g. This initial deviation is self-enforcing since no proper subset of the initially deviating
countries (neither l nor l0) has an incentive to alter its announcement unilaterally (i.e. announce-
ment prole that leads to hll0i is always a Nash equilibrium). Therefore, the announcement prole
that leads to ? is not a CPNE. We next examine whether announcement prole that leads to a
hshi is a CPNE. Note from Lemma 3 part (i) that wl(F   sh) > 0 for all  ,  and s and thus
countries l and l0 have an incentive to coalitionally change their announcements from fs; g and
fs; g to fs; l0g and fs; lg respectively, taking country ss announcement xed at s = fl; l0g. This
coalitional deviation would convert the hub and spoke regime hshi to free trade hF i and it is a
self-enforcing deviation since a larger exporting country has no incentive to unilaterally deviate
from its announcement that leads to free trade as established in Lemma 3. Now consider the an-
nouncement prole that leads to a hlhi. Note rst that we already established the following above:
s(F   ll0) > s(F   lh) for all  and , and thus the unilateral deviation incentive of country s
under 
F from s = fl; l0g to s = f; g leading to deviation from hF i to hll0i is stronger than the
the unilateral deviation incentive of country s from s = fl; l0g to s = fl; g, leading to deviation
from hF i to hlhi. This immediately implies that, when s < s(F   ll0) holds, country s under 
lh
always has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from from fl; g to f; g converting hlhi to hll0i
and thus hlhi is not even a Nash equilibrium (therefore not a CPNE).
Finally, we examine whether the announcement proles that lead to a bilateral FTAs are CPNE
when s < s(F   ll0). First consider the announcement prole 
ll0 . We have established above
that wl(ll0   ?) > 0 for all  ,  and s and thus 
ll0 is always a Nash equilibrium. When
s < s(F ll0) holds, small country has no incentive to participate in the coalitional announcement
deviation converting hll0i into hF i. Moreover, as we discussed above, country s under 
ll0 has no
incentive to jointly deviate with country l from their respective announcements f; g and f; l0g
to fl; g and fs; l0g leading to a deviation from hll0i to hlhi. Finally note from Lemma 3 that
even when coalitional deviations leading to deviation from hll0i to hsli and hll0i to hshi occur, they
are not self-enforcing since a proper subset of initially deviating countries has incentive to further
deviate. As a result, when free trade fails to a CPNE (when s < s(F   ll0)), 
ll0 arises as a
CPNE. We conclude our discussion with the discussion of whether 
sl is a CPNE. It turns out
to be that the critical deviation under 
sl is the joint announcement deviation of countries s and
l0 from their respective announcements fl; g and f; g to fl; l0g and fs; g converting hsli into
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hshi. We know from part (ii) of Lemma 3 that country s always has an incentive to participate
in such a coalitional deviation while country l0 does so only when s < l0(sh   sl). This joint
announcement deviation is self-enforcing since neither s nor l0 has an incentive to further deviate
taking the announcement of complements as given. When l0(sh   sl) < s < s(F   ll0) holds,
there exists no other self-enforcing deviation from 
sl and thus it is a CPNE. Based on the above
discussion, the following result is immediate:
Proposition 5: Suppose Assumption 2 holds and s < s(F   ll0). Then, the following result
holds:
(i) 
ll
0  fs = f; g; l = f; l0g; l0 = f; lgg leading to hll0i is always CPNE while
(ii) announcement proles leading to any bilateral FTA is CPNE when l0(sh   sl)  s 
s(F   ll0).
- Insert Figure 4-
The above proposition and Figure 4 imply that when the degree of asymmetry in comparative
advantage is su¢ ciently large and free trade fails to be a CPNE, bilateral FTAs emerge in the
equilibrium while hub and spoke regimes never arise. An asymmetric FTA hsli is a CPNE only
when the degree of asymmetry is moderate and the bound tari¤ rates are su¢ ciently high. When
the degree of asymmetry rises and/or the bound tari¤ rates fall su¢ ciently, the unique CPNE is the
FTA between two larger exporters. Here, it is important to emphasize that exclusion incentive does
not play any role in the equilibrium and thus we can not interpret these trade agreements as "gated
globalization" as in Lake and Roy (2017). Another important takeaway from the above result is
that, unlike Freund (2000), bilateral FTAs become less likely to be a CPNE as the bound tari¤
rates decline. As explained in detail before, the endogeneity in FTA formation and the exibility
of forming independent FTAs were absent in Freund (2000) and this creates the divergence in the
results.
Next, we show that our main result continues to hold under di¤erent structure of asymmetry
4.2 Two smaller one larger exporters
Consider now the case where two countries (smallerexporting countries denoted by s and s0) have
lower degrees of comparative advantages in their exporting sectors than the third (denoted by l;
refereed to as the largerexporting country). Accordingly, let the pattern of asymmetry be given
by:
Assumption 3:
  s = s0 < l =  (16)
Assuming that bound tari¤ rates are large enough so that they do not bind, the optimal tari¤
ranking under Assumption 3 is as follows
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ts(?) > tl(?) > tsl(ss0) > tls0(sl) > tss0(sl) > 0
Thus, as before, we have four distinct sub-scenarios as illustrated in Figure 5:
(i) no tari¤ binding scenario arises when  > ts (?) holds. Under such a case, all countries are
free to impose their optimal tari¤s under all feasible trade regimes (tari¤ binding overhang under
all regimes).
(ii) partial tari¤ binding scenarios:
- tl(?) <  < ts(?): except for country s under ? and as a non-member under the bilateral FTA
hs0li, countries are free to impose their optimal tari¤s under all feasible trade regimes. Country s
under ? and hs0li is constrained to impose the bound tari¤ rate  .
- tsl(ss0) <  < tl(?): countries under ? (and non-member countries under a bilateral FTA)
are constrained to impose their bound tari¤ rates while FTA member countries are free to impose
their optimal tari¤s.
- tls0(sl) <  < tsl(ss0): countries under ? (and non-member countries under a bilateral FTA)
and smaller member countries under hss0i (and as a spoke under hshi or hs0hi) are constrained
to impose their bound tari¤ rates while the member countries under the FTA between larger and
smaller countries, i.e. hsli and hs0li, are free to impose their optimal tari¤s.
- tss0(sl) <  < tls0(sl): except for the smaller member country under hsli and hs0li (and smaller
spoke country under hlhi), countries are constrained to impose their bound tari¤ rates.
(iii) full tari¤ binding scenario arises when  < ts(sl) holds. Under this scenario, all countries
lose their freedom to impose optimal tari¤s under the entire set of trade regimes and they are
required to apply their bound tari¤ rates (no tari¤ binding overhang).
- Insert Figure 5 -
To save space, we directly move to the following lemma that proves to be useful in deriving
when free trade is a CPNE:
Lemma 4: Suppose that Assumption 3 holds. Then, we have
(i) wi(ij  ?) > 0, i; j = s; s0; l for all  ,  and s;
(ii) wi(ih) > maxfwi(F ); wi(ij); wi(?)g, i; j = s; s0; l and ws(F   lh) = ws0(F   lh) > 0 for
all  ,  and s;
(iii) wl(F sh) = wl(F s0h) > 0 for all  ,  and s while ws(F s0h) = ws0(F sh) > 0
only when s > s(F   s0h);
(iv) wl(F   ss0) > 0 for all  ,  and s while ws(F   s0l) = ws0(F   sl) > 0 only when
s > s(F   s0l) and
(v) s(F   s0l) > s(F   s0h) for all  and .
It is immediate from the parts (iii) and (iv) of the above lemma that the larger exporting
country has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from its announcement that leads to free trade.
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Focusing on the coalitional deviations from the announcement prole leading to global free trade,
the rst and second part of Lemma 4 implies that, even when two countries have incentives to
jointly deviate, such coalitional deviation is never self-enforcing. To see it more clearly, taking the
announcement of country l as given, consider the joint deviation of two smaller exporting countries
from their respective announcements s = fs0; lg and s0 = fs; lg to s = fs0; g and s0 = fs; g
leading to deviation from hF i to hss0i. Such deviation happens only when s > s(F   ss0).
However, the second part of Lemma 4 informs us that, taking the announcement of country l as
given: l = fs; s0g, either of the initially deviating smaller exporting countries (say s) has an
incentive to further deviate from s = fs0; g to s = fs0; lg to become the hub country under
hshi. The similar intuition applies for the coalitional deviation of one of the smaller exporting
countries and the larger exporting country to exclude the other smaller exporting country. Either
of the initially deviating countries has incentive to further deviate, making the initial deviation
not self-enforcing.17 Therefore, we restate our previous nding: although exclusion incentives exist
when bound tari¤ rates are su¢ ciently low, the exibility that FTA members have in forming an
additional FTA yields that such incentive goes unexercised in the equilibrium.
The above discussion together with part (v) of Lemma 4 informs us that, as before, the unilateral
announcement deviation of a smaller exporting country (say s) from s = fs0; lg to s = f; g
leading to deviation from hF i to hs0li determines whether 
F is a CPNE:
Proposition 6: Suppose Assumption 3 holds. Then, 
F  fs = fl; l0g; l = fs; l0g; l0 = fs; lgg
leading to hF i is CPNE only when s > s(F   s0l) and it is more likely to be a CPNE as bound
tari¤ rates fall.
- Insert Figure 6-
The above result, represented in Figure 6, argues that our main nding is robust to the structure
of asymmetry: free riding incentive of smaller exporting countries is pivotal for free trade to arise
in the equilibrium while exclusion incentives go unexercised. As bound tari¤ rates decline, free
riding incentives fall and multilateral free trade becomes more likely to be a CPNE.18
So far, our ndings suggest that, due to the exibility of FTA formation, exclusion incentives go
unexercised in the equilibrium. What if the preferential trade agreement is a customs union rather
than an FTA and hub and spoke regimes are not feasible? Next, we examine this question under
complete symmetry to shed light on the implications of common external tari¤ requirement of CU.
17Two smaller countries can have incentives to coalitionally deviate from their free trade announcements to an-
nouncements leading to no agreement. This coalitional deviation is not self-enforcing as well due to part (i) of Lemma
4.
18What if s(F   s0l) and global free trade fails to obtain? Under such a case, we nd that the announcement
prole leading to a bilateral FTA between a smaller exporting country and the larger exporting country (hsli or hs0li)
is the CPNE.
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5 Customs Union
Suppose the PTA under consideration is a CU as opposed to an FTA and countries are symmetric
with respect to their comparative advantage (Assumption 1 holds). To have a comparable result
and gure to the ones under the FTA game, we assume that   12 .19
As under the FTA game, at the rst stage of the CU formation game each country announces
the names of countries with whom it wants to form a CU. Country is announcement is denoted
by i and its strategy set Siu consists of four possible announcements:
Siu = ff; g; fju; g; f; kug; fju; kugg (17)
where f; g denotes an announcement in favor of no CU with either trading partners, fju; g in
favor of a CU with only country j; f; kug in favor of a CU with only country k; and fju; kug
in favor of a CU that includes both its trading partners (announcement in favor of free trade).
The mapping between various announcements proles and the CUs that can arise is as follows: (i)
when no two announcements match or the only matching announcements are f; g we obtain no
agreement ?; (ii) a CU between countries i and j denoted by hijui is formed if they announce
each othersnames and there is no other matching announcement: i.e. hijui is formed if ju 2 i,
iu 2 j and both (a) ku =2 i and/or iu =2 k and (b) ku =2 j and/or ju =2 k hold; (iv) free trade
hF i obtains i¤ all countries announce each others names. Recall that the equivalent of a hub and
spoke trading regime cannot arise under the CU game due to the fact that CU members coordinate
their external tari¤s.
As is well known, the central di¤erence between an FTA and a CU is that members of a CU
impose common external tari¤s on non-members whereas FTA members adopt individually optimal
tari¤s. This di¤erence in tari¤ setting behavior between the two types of PTAs has an important
consequence a¤ecting the role of exclusion incentive in the equilibrium determination. It is crucial
to note that, while an FTA member is free to enter into additional trade agreements (such as hub
and spoke trading regimes) with non-member countries without requiring consent from its existing
FTA partners, a CU member can only do so if all other members also agree to participate in the
new agreements. In other words, FTA members enjoy more exibility in agreement formation than
CU members.
While the optimal tari¤ analysis under no agreement stays the same as before, optimal tari¤
determination under a bilateral CU is di¤erent due to the common external tari¤ requirement. Here,
it is worth mentioning that since each country is the unique importer of a good in our competing
exporters model, the "market power e¤ect" of a CU emphasized by Bagwell and Staiger (1997a)
does not arise since that e¤ect arises only when CU members competefor imports.20 As a result,
the coordination of tari¤s is benecial to CU members only because each members internalizes the
19Note that when  is su¢ ently large, free trade fails to be a CPNE under the CU game regardles of bound tari¤
rates since exclusion incentives always arise.
20See Missios et al. (2016) and Saggi et al. (2018) for details of tari¤ setting behavior in a competing importers
model.
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e¤ect of its tari¤ on the export surplus of the other member. If two countries form a CU, they
remove tari¤s on each other and impose jointly optimal external tari¤s (denoted by tui and t
u
j ) on
the non-member country.21 The tari¤ pair (tui ; t
u
j ) is chosen to solve:
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max
tui ; t
u
j
wi(ij) + wj(ij) subject to tij = tji = 0 (18)
Since countries are symmetric, we have tui = t
u
j = t
u and the optimal external tari¤ of each CU
member is given by
tu =

(+ 2)(3+ 10)
(19)
Note that, under symmetry, the formation of a CU induces each member country to lower its tari¤
on the non-member relative to the status quo (i.e. the model exhibits tari¤ complementarity): tu <
t.23 Moreover, unlike an FTA, member countries under a CU internalize each others export surplus
under the joint welfare maximization and thus higher external tari¤ (weaker tari¤ complementarity)
arises: tf < tu < t. Similar to the FTA game under symmetry, we have three tari¤ binding
scenarios (illustrated in Figure 6):
(i) no tari¤ binding scenario where the bound tari¤ rate exceeds the optimal tari¤ under No
agreement:  > tz (?) so that countries are free to impose their optimal tari¤s under all trade
regimes (the above optimal tari¤s apply);
(ii) partial tari¤ binding scenario where the bound tari¤ rate exceeds the optimal tari¤ under
a CU but falls below the optimal tari¤ under No agreement: tu <  < t?. Under such a case,
countries under ? and the non-member country under a CU impose the bound rate  while the
member countries under a CU are free to impose their optimal external tari¤s.
(iii) full tari¤ binding scenario where the bound tari¤ rate below the optimal tari¤ under an
FTA:  < tu. Under this scenario, countries lose their freedom to impose optimal tari¤s under all
trade regimes and apply their bound tari¤ rates (no tari¤ binding overhang).
- Insert Figure 7 -
It is immediate from the preceding tari¤ discussion that while no tari¤ binding scenario stays
the same under both FTA and CU formation games, the bound tari¤ rate ranges shrink under the
21Our simple formulation of a CUs tari¤ choice problem is intuitively appealing and in line with much of existing
literature. However, Syropoulos (2003) has shown that the nature of the sharing rule of a CU with respect to tari¤
revenue can a¤ect tari¤ preferences as well as the trade patterns of CU members in ways that can prevent the
implementation of jointly optimal tari¤s. An important insight of his analysis is that CU members have an incentive
to inuence their common tari¤s not just for external terms-of-trade reasons but also for internal distributional
purposes. Given the focus of our paper, we abstract from such considerations.
22The assumption that the CU maximizes the sum of national utilities is commonly employed in the literature.
Issues of the delegation of tari¤-setting authority and the choice of weights in the social welfare function are discussed
by Gatsios and Karp (1991) and Melatos and Woodland (2007).
23 It is noteworthy that tari¤ complementarity also arises in the general equilibrium model of Bond et. al. (2004).
For empirical evidence regarding tari¤ complementarity in the context of the Latin American CU MERCOSUR, see
Estevadeordal et. al. (2008).
28
partial tari¤ binding scenario and expands under the full tari¤ binding scenario when the PTA is
a CU relative to an FTA since tf < tu.
Before deriving the equilibrium trade agreements under the CU formation game, we establish
the following lemma:
Lemma 5: Suppose that countries have symmetric comparative advantage. Then, we have:
(i) wi(iju  ?) = wj(iju  ?) > 0 and wk(iju  ?) < 0 for all  and ;
(ii) wi(F   iju) = wj(F   iju) > 0 only when  > bu() where tu < bu() < t?;
(iii) wk(F   iju) > 0 for all  and ;
Note that, relative to an FTA formation game, each member country internalizes the negative
externality of each others external tari¤ via common external tari¤ determination under the CU
and thus benets more from a bilateral CU formation. Therefore, as under the FTA game, a pair
of symmetric countries under ? always have an incentive to form a bilateral CU and thus the
announcements leading to a bilateral CU is always a Nash equilibrium and 
? is not a CPNE
of the CU game. Unlike the FTA game, the formation of a bilateral CU always makes the non-
member country worse-o¤ irrespective of the bound tari¤ rates and thus the formation of a CU is
never Pareto-improving since it always makes member countries better o¤ at the expense of the
non-member. Consistent with this intuition, part (iii) of the above lemma informs us that there
exists no free riding incentive on trade liberalization of the other two member countries via CU. As
a result, the announcement prole 
F leading to hF i is always a Nash equilibrium.
Similar to the FTA game, the second part of the above lemma argues in favor of the idea that
two countries have incentives to exclude the third country from free trade network when bound
tari¤ rates are su¢ ciently low. Note that when the bound tari¤ rates fall below tz (?), the non-
member country loses its ability to set its optimal MFN tari¤ under a bilateral CU while facing a
larger tari¤ under a CU relative to an FTA. Joint welfare maximization implies that the exclusion
incentive is stronger under a CU relative to an FTA and thus bu() > b() for all . Here, it is
important to note that Saggi et al. (2013) show that there exists no exclusion incentive under a
CU formation game in a competing exporters model when bound tari¤ rates are not taken into
account and thus all external tari¤s are optimally set. Our result conrms this nding under no
tari¤ binding scenariobut goes one step further and suggests that this result fails to hold when
countries are constrained in imposing their optimal tari¤s due to su¢ ciently low bound tari¤ rates.
Recall that the key message in the FTA game was that even though a pair of countries benet
from excluding the third country from their trade agreement, they are unable to exercise this
exclusion incentive in equilibrium. The exible nature of FTAs plays a crucial role in ensuring
that the exclusion incentive goes unexercised in the FTA game. Since hub and spoke regimes
cannot arise under the CU formation game, are countries able to exercise the exclusion incentive
in equilibrium?
It is immediate from Lemma 4 that 
F is a CPNE of the CU game only when   bu()
where tu < bu() < t?. To see why, taking the complements announcement as given, simply
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consider the coalitional deviation of countries i and j from 
F to 
iju  fi = fju; g; j = fiu; g
k = fiu; jugg. Observe from Lemma 4 that this coalitional deviation happens when  < bu(),
altering the trade regime from free trade to the CU hijui and since CU members enjoy higher welfare
than that under no agreement, neither member country has an incentive to further unilaterally alter
its announcements and thus the initial deviation is self-enforcing.
Finally, we argue that the announcement prole leading to a bilateral CU is a CPNE only when
  bu(). Starting with any Nash equilibrium announcement prole that yields the CU hijui,
member countries have no incentive to jointly alter their announcements to either obtain ? or hF i
since they are worse o¤ under either of these outcomes. Thus, we can state the following result,
illustrated in Figure 8:
Proposition 7: Suppose that countries have symmetric comparative advantage. Then, in a CU
formation game
(i) 
F leading to global free trade is a CPNE only when   bu() and
(ii) 
iju leading to a bilateral CU is a CPNE only when   bu()
The main di¤erence between the results in the FTA game (Proposition 2) and the CU game
(Proposition 6) is driven by the relatively exible nature of FTAs compared to CUs. In the FTA
game, when two countries (i and j) have incentives to jointly exclude the third country from free
trade by forming a bilateral FTA, each member has an incentive to sign an independent FTA with
the excluded country thereby making itself a hub. The ability to act on this incentive acts as a
deterrent for the other initially deviating country (say j) since it is worse o¤ as a spoke under
hihi relative to free trade and thus the initial joint deviation from the announcement prole 
F to

ij does not occur. However, unlike the FTA game, no such deterrent exists under the CU game
since a CU member cannot form an independent agreement with the excluded country without the
consent of its CU partner.
- Insert Figure 8 -
It is immediate from Figure 6 that global free trade is less likely to be a CPNE as the bound
tari¤ rates fall. Here, we should emphasize that while our FTA results diverges from Freund
(2000), Proposition 6 provides support for Freund (2000) when preferential trade agreement is a
customs union rather than an FTA: multilateral tari¤ reduction enhances the incentives to form a
bilateral CU relative to free trade since the set-up in Freund (2000) converges to our CU formation
game where hub and spoke regime is not feasible and exclusion incentive plays a crucial role in
equilibrium. While the PTA formation and multilateral tari¤ reduction are modeled di¤erently,
another important observation would be that the above result is also consistent with Lake and Roy
(2017), arguing that gated globalizationbecomes more likely as the multilateral tari¤ reduction
gets deeper when the PTA under consideration takes the form of a CU rather than an FTA.
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6 Conclusion
Following the last successful multilateral round, the last few decades have witnessed a dramatic ex-
plosion in the numbers and membership of preferential trade agreements. The widespread concern
that the formation of PTAs may undermine multilateral liberalization led to an extensive litera-
ture that has addressed whether PTA formation help or hinder the prospects of global free trade.
However, the reverse analysis on how multilateral tari¤ reduction a¤ects the formation of PTAs
and alters the role of Article XXIV of the GATT in achieving global free trade is relatively scarce.
It is highly important given that multilateral trade liberalization constrains the ability of countries
to impose their external tari¤s and thus change their preferences for participating in preferential
trade agreements. In an extensive survey by Freund and Ornelas (2010), they laid out the concerns
regarding the lack of research on the e¤ect of global tari¤ negotiations on PTA formation. Mo-
tivated these concerns, the present paper employs an endogenous PTA formation model in which
countries face exogenously given multilaterally negotiated bound tari¤ rates. It is important to
note that the entire literature on the role of PTAs ignores the role of bound tari¤ rates in the tari¤
setting behavior and examine the PTA formation assuming that countries are free in setting their
optimal tari¤s. This paper aims to overcome this shortcoming by examining PTA formation under
di¤erent tari¤ binding scenarios.
The main objective of the present paper is to examine how multilateral trade liberalization
via reduction in the bound tari¤ rates a¤ects the preferences of both member and non-member
countries regarding PTAs and whether PTA formation ultimately leads to global free trade or ends
prematurely with a fragmented trading world with gated globalization. To this end, we examine
both FTA and CU formation games and try to shed light on the interaction between bilateral and
multilateral approaches to trade liberalization with a ner lens.
We argue that the exible nature of FTA formation due to the independent external tari¤
setting relative to CU plays a major role in identifying whether free riding or exclusion incentives
play pivotal role in equilibrium. We rst show that, when countries are completely symmetric,
no country has an incentive to free ride on trade liberalization by the other two countries while
two countries have incentives to exclude the third one free trade network when bound tari¤s are
su¢ ciently low. Due to the exibility in FTA formation, such exclusion incentives go unexercised
and free trade always obtains as the coalition proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) of the FTA game.
However, since hub and spoke regimes are not allowed in the CU game, countries are able to
exercise the exclusion incentive and thus free trade fails to be CPNE when the bound tari¤ rates
are su¢ ciently low. This result suggests that, when countries are symmetric, the pursuit of CUs
undermines global free trade when bound tari¤s are su¢ ciently low while FTA formation always
act as building blocs irrespective of the bound tari¤ rates. We then question when and why, if
any, global free trade fails to obtain in FTA formation game. To this end, we consider a scenario
where countries are asymmetric with respect to their comparative advantage. Our ndings suggest
that the country with a weaker comparative advantage in the exporting goods (thus larger importer
country) has incentive to free ride on trade liberalization of the other two countries and this incentive
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is critical for whether multilateral free trade obtains as a CPNE. Since the reduction in bound tari¤
rates disciplines the ability of the free riding smaller exporting country in setting its external tari¤s,
multilateral free trade arises more likely as a CPNE (and thus act as a building bloc). This result
provides support for the idea that multilateral trade liberalization acts as a complement to the
FTA formation in achieving global free trade.
It is important to note that FTA formation and CU formation games are examined in isolation
and the choice between these two types of PTAs is not endogenously determined. The next step
would be to examine the similar question in a dynamic set-up employed by Lake and Yildiz (2016)
where we can also endogenize the choice of PTA type and examine a pure farsighted PTA formation
under exogenously given bound tari¤ rates. We leave this for future research.
7 Appendix
In this Appendix we provide the necessary supporting calculations and proofs.
7.1 Welfare levels
We begin by reporting welfare levels under di¤erent policy regimes as a function of tari¤s and com-
parative advantage. For an arbitrary tari¤s vector t=(tij ; tik; tji; tjk; tki; tkj), we can write country
is welfare as
wi =
X
g
CSgi +
X
g
PSgi +
X
z 6=i
tizx
I
z,
where consumer surplus in country i equals
X
g
CSgi =
1
2
h 
  P Ii
2
+
 
  P Jj + tji
2
+
 
  P Jk + tki
2i
,
its producer surplus equals
X
g
PSgi =
1
2
h 
P Ii
2
+ (1 + i)
 
P Jj   tji
2
+ (1 + i)
 
PKk   tki
2i
and the tari¤ revenue is given by
X
z 6=i
tizx
I
z = tij [(2 + j)P
I
j   ] + tik[2 + k)P Ik   ]
Using the above formulae and the optimal tari¤ levels reported in the text, we can easily
calculate welfare levels under all possible trade regimes. To save space, we do not include the
algebraic details underlying these straightforward calculations.
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Proof of Lemma 1
Using the welfare and optimum tari¤ levels (when feasible) reported in the text and setting
z = , where z = i; j; k; we can show the following for all  and :
4wi(ij  ?) = 4wj(ij  ?) > 0
wk(F   ij) > 0;wi(ih  F ) > 0;wi(ih  ij) > 0;wi(ih ?) > 0; and wj(F   ih) > 0.
We also have:
4wk(ij  ?) > 0 when  > () where tf < () < t?
wj(ih  ik) = wk(ih  ij) > 0 when  < () where tf < () < t?
and
()  () for all 
Proof of Proposition 1a
Under symmetry, wi(F   ij) = wj(F   ij) < 0 when  < b() where tf < b() < t? and
@wi(F ij)
@ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
It is immediate from the above welfare and reported optimum tari¤ levels (when feasible) and
Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1b
While wi(F ij) = wj(F ij) < 0 and two symmetric countries have an incentive to exclude
the third when  < b(), it is immediate from part (iii) of Lemma 1 that each of the excluding
countries have incentives to further deviate and thus the initial deviation is not self-enforcing,
implying that the exclusion incentive goes unexercised.
Proof of Proposition 2
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Using the Lemma 1 and Proposition 1a, there exists no self-enforcing deviation from the an-
nouncement prole leading to free trade.
Proof of Lemma 2
Using the welfare and optimum tari¤ levels (when feasible) reported above and setting  
s < l = l0 = , we can show the following for any  and :
@wl(F  ?)
@s
< 0;
@wl0(F   sl)
@s
< 0;
@wl(F   ll0)
@s
< 0;
@wl0(F   lh)
@s
< 0;
@wl(sl  ?)
@s
< 0;
@wl0(sh  sl)
@s
< 0 and
@wl(lh  ll0)
@s
< 0
Proof of Lemma 3
Using the welfare and reported optimum tari¤ levels (when feasible) and setting   s < l =
l0 = , we can show the following for any  and :
wl(sl  ?) > 0;wl(lh  ll0) > 0;wl(F   ) > 0;wl(F   sl0) > 0 and wl(F   l0h) > 0
and
wl(F   sh) > 0 and ws(sh  sl) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Using parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3, even when two countries have incentives to jointly exclude
the third, this joint deviation from the announcement prole leading to free trade is not self-
enforcing since each of the initially deviating country has an incentive to further deviate to become
the hub country: wl(lh  ll0) > 0 and ws(sh  sl) > 0 for all  and .
Proof of Proposition 4
As clearly shown in the text, using Lemma 3 and Proposition 3, the binding self-enforcing
deviation from the announcement prole leading to global free trade is the unilateral deviation of
the smaller exporting country from s = fl; l0g to s = f; g leading to deviation from hF i to
hll0i: ws(F   ll0)  0 when s < s(F   ll0) where @s(F ll
0)
@  0.
Proof of Proposition 5
When s < s(F   ll0) holds, the announcement prole leading to global free trade fails to be
CPNE. Announcement prole leading to no agreement ? is never a CPNE since wl(ll0  ?) > 0
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for all  ,  and s. Similarly, the announcement prole leading to hlhi is never a CPNE as well. To
see it more clearly, it is immediate from Lemma 3 part (i) that wl(F  sh) > 0 for all  ,  and s
and thus two larger exporters always have an incentive to coalitionally change their announcements
from fs; g and fs; g to fs; l0g and fs; lg respectively, taking country ss announcement xed at
s = fl; l0g. It is a self-enforcing deviation since a larger exporting country has no incentive to
unilaterally deviate from its announcement that leads to free trade as established in Lemma 3. When
we consider the announcement prole that leads to a hlhi, we rst note that s(F ll0) > s(F lh)
and thus country s under 
lh always has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from from fl; g to
f; g converting hlhi to hll0i and thus the announcement prole leading to hlhi is not even a Nash
equilibrium (therefore not a CPNE). Note that there exists no self enforcing coalitional deviations
from the announcement prole 
ll
0
and thus it is a CPNE when s < s(F   ll0). Finally, the
critical deviation under 
sl is the joint announcement deviation of countries s and l0 from their
respective announcements fl; g and f; g to fl; l0g and fs; g converting hsli into hshi. We know
from part (ii) of Lemma 3 that country s always has an incentive to participate in such a coalitional
deviation while country l0 does so only when s < l0(sh  sl). This joint announcement deviation
is self-enforcing since neither s nor l0 has an incentive to further deviate taking the announcement
of complements as given. When l0(sh   sl) < s < s(F   ll0) holds, there exists no other
self-enforcing deviation from 
sl and thus it is a CPNE.
Proof of Lemma 4
Using the welfare and optimum tari¤ levels (when feasible) reported in the text and setting
  s = s0 < l = , we can show the following for all  ,  and s:
wi(ij  ?) > 0; i; j = s; s0; l
wi(ih) > maxfwi(F ); wi(ij); wi(?)g, i; j = s; s0; l and ws(F   lh) = ws0(F   lh) > 0
wl(F   sh) = wl(F   s0h) > 0
wl(F   ss0) > 0
s(F   s0l) > s(F   s0h) and @s(F   s
0l)
@
 0
and we have:
ws(F   s0h) = ws0(F   sh) > 0 when s > s(F   s0h)
ws(F   s0l) = ws0(F   sl) > 0 when s > s(F   s0l)
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Proof of Proposition 6
As clearly shown in the text, using Lemma 4, the binding self-enforcing deviation from the
announcement prole leading to global free trade is the unilateral deviation of the smaller exporting
country from s = fs0; lg to s = f; g leading to deviation from hF i to hs0li: ws(F   s0l)  0
when s < s(F   s0l) where @s(F s
0l)
@  0.
Proof of Lemma 5
Using the welfare and optimum tari¤ levels (when feasible) reported in the text and setting
z = , where z = i; j; k; we can show the following:
wi(ij
u  ?) = wj(iju  ?) > 0; wk(iju  ?) < 0 and wk(F   iju) > 0 for all  and 
and
wi(F   iju) = wj(F   iju) > 0 when  > bu() where tu < bu() < t?
Proof of Proposition 7
As clearly shown in the text, using Lemma 5, the binding self-enforcing deviation from the
announcement prole leading to global free trade is the coalitional deviation of two symmetric
countries to exclude the third one from the free trade network: wi(F   iju) = wj(F   iju) >
0 when  > bu() where tu < bu() < t?. When  < bu() holds, the announcement prole leading
to global free trade fails to be CPNE. Announcement prole leading to no agreement ? is never a
CPNE since wi(iju ?) = wj(iju ?) > 0 for all  and . The announcement prole leading
to a bilateral CU is a CPNE only when   bu().
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Figure 1: FTA tariff schedule - Symmetry
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Figure 5: FTA tariff schedule - Asymmetry I
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Figure 6: Free Trade is CPNE - Asymmetry II
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Figure 7: CU tariff schedule - Symmetry
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Figure 8: Stable quilibrium under CU - (CU game) Symmetry
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